dev-libs/openssl: drop 3.1.0-r3

Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/903545
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/907413
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
This commit is contained in:
Sam James
2023-06-14 06:20:29 +01:00
parent 6c4610dbaf
commit 14aa976d66
6 changed files with 0 additions and 627 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,5 @@ DIST openssl-1.1.1u.tar.gz 9892176 BLAKE2B 5de9cb856e497596ecba008bad6515eefd093
DIST openssl-1.1.1u.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 7a978a94264a14be04372fea39868e9177e8a0b0f24344267702022e19ee0f52e91ad141d7c54da870f7ec0df9b2e43b80939f1d274dd0b44d36da2670e3a468 SHA512 40245d65ace95b2002bf64bcba184c92fec3420b08d9f61f3a709c4842e9478595105d8adce33a08eb98d351d2a0989ec342b08cdd9104498ea0543b6e592d28
DIST openssl-3.0.9.tar.gz 15181285 BLAKE2B cc1df41fa12ba4443e15e94f6ebdc5e103b9dab5eab2e1c8f74e6a74fa2c38207817921b65d7293cb241c190a910191c7163600bb75243adde0e2f9ec31cc885 SHA512 86c99146b37236419b110db77dd3ac3992e6bed78c258f0cc3434ca233460b4e17c0ac81d7058547fe9cb72a9fd80ee56d4b4916bb731dbe2bbcf1c3d46bf31a
DIST openssl-3.0.9.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 9943ac65f83f48465cae83b37a1d004f6be4622e53c3025166d42954abe9215f1a6c2af58d4aa2b45fa51182fee5019e740969f694655b6c592bb278c68aacef SHA512 9949de6b57d5aa21da1d4b68a29eb37e302403c983bd7d2d8769b320aac4268a9f9091c5fb182862a4f89a9099660939fe609df87c66991b75f7695faf357caf
DIST openssl-3.1.0.tar.gz 15525381 BLAKE2B 9212a7fb13f6dee7746721ee406af56ae1b48ec58974c002465d2b0205839eb5ee0483383aa9924fc3e4168ebd34e1a5819480cf10aa318994d7171e54c07108 SHA512 71cc75c7700f445c616e382b76263ad2e4072beec0232458baf3d9891b8b64a7ad0cac4b4d24b727b2b7dcd100c78606fd48eba98a67eccd5f336e3d626ca713
DIST openssl-3.1.0.tar.gz.asc 488 BLAKE2B f4a844e3db2c2bdf42b6f811d16cc2077cacf713d20474d94e2d0180a6f97eadf4f03522e9fed478d263d680d88091dc2bc48e7ebb15d049bc57ee7ed64c7fbb SHA512 8d542e6471b745822d6cd889c5b168841b4366ee9a96edc2ab5b44fa1bd1b75308422aed312f1bd6e6a3c3e306eceaa95ce9bb4d0aa3e8ff86cb0fd92a7e61ea
DIST openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz 15544757 BLAKE2B 094f7e28f16de6528016fcd21df1d7382b0dbdcd80ec469d37add9c37f638c059dda3ffb4415eba890a33d146ddc9016bcc7192df101c73be5e70faf6e3b1097 SHA512 8ba9dd6ab87451e126c19cc106ccd1643ca48667d6c37504d0ab98205fbccf855fd0db54474b4113c4c3a15215a4ef77a039fb897a69f71bcab2054b2effd1d9
DIST openssl-3.1.1.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 5a2a9aeb475b843862e133d53bc5bb3c8e12e8e03b1e2da41d0eaa0eade1ae03c4318ad1f5c490c5e1ed7e6ac6275a6d7c881d99993911722b043b15d1622b25 SHA512 83349020c67e5b956f3ef37604a03a1970ea393f862691f5fd5d85930c01e559e25db17d397d8fd230c3862a8b2fba2d5c7df883d56d7472f4c01dab3a661cb2
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
commit 2017771e2db3e2b96f89bbe8766c3209f6a99545
Author: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
Date: Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100
x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.
Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20570)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
};
struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_count;
+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_maximum;
+
/* This is the tree 'level' data */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
int nlevel;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data);
void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data)
{
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
+ return NULL;
+
node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
if (node == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
node->data = data;
node->parent = parent;
- if (level) {
+ if (level != NULL) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
if (level->anyPolicy)
goto node_error;
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
- if (tree) {
+ if (extra_data) {
if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
+ tree->node_count++;
if (parent)
parent->nchild++;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
#include "pcy_local.h"
+/*
+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
+ *
+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
+#endif
+
static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
int indent)
@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
}
+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
+
/*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
*
@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
goto bad_tree;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
goto bad_tree;
}
@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
int i, matched = 0;
@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
int i;
@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
ossl_policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
if (last->anyPolicy &&
ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
- tree);
+ tree, 1);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
commit facfb1ab745646e97a1920977ae4a9965ea61d5c
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000
Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs
Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20586)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
goto memerr;
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
- int i;
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
+ cbcalled = 1;
CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
}
+ if (!cbcalled) {
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
return 1;
}
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
commit fc814a30fc4f0bc54fcea7d9a7462f5457aab061
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100
Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20562)
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 20aea99b5b..fcbbfc4c30 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
+policy checking.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
commit bc2f61ad70971869b242fc1cb445b98bad50074a
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Mon Apr 17 16:51:20 2023 +0200
aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryption
Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon)
Fixes: CVE-2023-1255
The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes.
Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)
(cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304)
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
index ea74217317..efd3ccd1a4 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
@@ -3367,7 +3367,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
.align 4
.Lxts_dec_tail4x:
add $inp,$inp,#16
- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
+ tst $tailcnt,#0xf
veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
@@ -3376,6 +3376,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
+ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort
+ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16
b .Lxts_done
.align 4
.Lxts_outer_dec_tail:
-284
View File
@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2023 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=8
VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH="${BROOT}"/usr/share/openpgp-keys/openssl.org.asc
inherit edo flag-o-matic linux-info toolchain-funcs multilib-minimal multiprocessing verify-sig
DESCRIPTION="Robust, full-featured Open Source Toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssl.org/"
MY_P=${P/_/-}
if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then
EGIT_REPO_URI="https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git"
inherit git-r3
else
SRC_URI="
mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )
"
#KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86"
fi
S="${WORKDIR}"/${MY_P}
LICENSE="Apache-2.0"
SLOT="0/$(ver_cut 1)" # .so version of libssl/libcrypto
IUSE="+asm cpu_flags_x86_sse2 fips ktls rfc3779 sctp static-libs test tls-compression vanilla verify-sig weak-ssl-ciphers"
RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
COMMON_DEPEND="
!<net-misc/openssh-9.2_p1-r3
tls-compression? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
"
BDEPEND="
>=dev-lang/perl-5
sctp? ( >=net-misc/lksctp-tools-1.0.12 )
test? (
sys-apps/diffutils
sys-devel/bc
sys-process/procps
)
verify-sig? ( >=sec-keys/openpgp-keys-openssl-20230207 )"
DEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
RDEPEND="${COMMON_DEPEND}"
PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
/usr/include/openssl/configuration.h
)
PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0464.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0465.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-0466.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.1.0-CVE-2023-1255.patch
)
pkg_setup() {
if use ktls ; then
if kernel_is -lt 4 18 ; then
ewarn "Kernel implementation of TLS (USE=ktls) requires kernel >=4.18!"
else
CONFIG_CHECK="~TLS ~TLS_DEVICE"
ERROR_TLS="You will be unable to offload TLS to kernel because CONFIG_TLS is not set!"
ERROR_TLS_DEVICE="You will be unable to offload TLS to kernel because CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE is not set!"
use test && CONFIG_CHECK+=" ~CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER"
linux-info_pkg_setup
fi
fi
[[ ${MERGE_TYPE} == binary ]] && return
# must check in pkg_setup; sysctl doesn't work with userpriv!
if use test && use sctp ; then
# test_ssl_new will fail with "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled in kernel"
# if sctp.auth_enable is not enabled.
local sctp_auth_status=$(sysctl -n net.sctp.auth_enable 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -z "${sctp_auth_status}" ]] || [[ ${sctp_auth_status} != 1 ]] ; then
die "FEATURES=test with USE=sctp requires net.sctp.auth_enable=1!"
fi
fi
}
src_unpack() {
# Can delete this once test fix patch is dropped
if use verify-sig ; then
# Needed for downloaded patch (which is unsigned, which is fine)
verify-sig_verify_detached "${DISTDIR}"/${P}.tar.gz{,.asc}
fi
default
}
src_prepare() {
# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
rm -f Makefile
if ! use vanilla ; then
PATCHES+=(
# Add patches which are Gentoo-specific customisations here
)
fi
default
if use test && use sctp && has network-sandbox ${FEATURES} ; then
einfo "Disabling test '80-test_ssl_new.t' which is known to fail with FEATURES=network-sandbox ..."
rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die
fi
# Test fails depending on kernel configuration, bug #699134
rm test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t || die
}
src_configure() {
# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
# Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
# and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (bug #417795 again)
tc-is-clang && append-flags -Qunused-arguments
# We really, really need to build OpenSSL w/ strict aliasing disabled.
# It's filled with violations and it *will* result in miscompiled
# code. This has been in the ebuild for > 10 years but even in 2022,
# it's still relevant:
# - https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/55255
# - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18225
# - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663#issuecomment-1181478057
# Don't remove the no strict aliasing bits below!
filter-flags -fstrict-aliasing
append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
# The OpenSSL developers don't test with LTO right now, it leads to various
# warnings/errors (which may or may not be false positives), it's considered
# unsupported, and it's not tested in CI: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663.
filter-lto
append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
# bug #197996
unset APPS
# bug #312551
unset SCRIPTS
# bug #311473
unset CROSS_COMPILE
tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC
multilib-minimal_src_configure
}
multilib_src_configure() {
use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
# See if our toolchain supports __uint128_t. If so, it's 64bit
# friendly and can use the nicely optimized code paths, bug #460790.
#local ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
#
# Disable it for now though (bug #469976)
# Do NOT re-enable without substantial discussion first!
#
#echo "__uint128_t i;" > "${T}"/128.c
#if ${CC} ${CFLAGS} -c "${T}"/128.c -o /dev/null >&/dev/null ; then
# ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
#fi
local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4")
einfo "Using configuration: ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/INSTALL.md#enable-and-disable-features
local myeconfargs=(
${sslout}
$(use cpu_flags_x86_sse2 || echo "no-sse2")
enable-camellia
enable-ec
enable-ec2m
enable-sm2
enable-srp
$(use elibc_musl && echo "no-async")
enable-idea
enable-mdc2
enable-rc5
$(use fips && echo "enable-fips")
$(use_ssl asm)
$(use_ssl ktls)
$(use_ssl rfc3779)
$(use_ssl sctp)
$(use test || echo "no-tests")
$(use_ssl tls-compression zlib)
$(use_ssl weak-ssl-ciphers)
--prefix="${EPREFIX}"/usr
--openssldir="${EPREFIX}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}
--libdir=$(get_libdir)
shared
threads
)
edo perl "${S}/Configure" "${myeconfargs[@]}"
}
multilib_src_compile() {
emake build_sw
if multilib_is_native_abi; then
emake build_docs
fi
}
multilib_src_test() {
# VFP = show subtests verbosely and show failed tests verbosely
# Normal V=1 would show everything verbosely but this slows things down.
emake HARNESS_JOBS="$(makeopts_jobs)" VFP=1 test
}
multilib_src_install() {
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw
if use fips; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_fips
# Regen this in pkg_preinst, bug 900625
rm "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}"/fipsmodule.cnf || die
fi
if multilib_is_native_abi; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_ssldirs
emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR='$(INSTALLTOP)'/share/doc/${PF} install_docs
fi
# This is crappy in that the static archives are still built even
# when USE=static-libs. But this is due to a failing in the openssl
# build system: the static archives are built as PIC all the time.
# Only way around this would be to manually configure+compile openssl
# twice; once with shared lib support enabled and once without.
if ! use static-libs ; then
rm "${ED}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.a || die
fi
}
multilib_src_install_all() {
# openssl installs perl version of c_rehash by default, but
# we provide a shell version via app-misc/c_rehash
rm "${ED}"/usr/bin/c_rehash || die
dodoc {AUTHORS,CHANGES,NEWS,README,README-PROVIDERS}.md doc/*.txt doc/${PN}-c-indent.el
# Create the certs directory
keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs
# bug #254521
dodir /etc/sandbox.d
echo 'SANDBOX_PREDICT="/dev/crypto"' > "${ED}"/etc/sandbox.d/10openssl
diropts -m0700
keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
}
pkg_preinst() {
if use fips; then
# Regen fipsmodule.cnf, bug 900625
ebegin "Running openssl fipsinstall"
"${ED}/usr/bin/openssl" fipsinstall -quiet \
-out "${ED}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/fipsmodule.cnf" \
-module "${ED}/usr/$(get_libdir)/ossl-modules/fips.so"
eend $?
fi
}
pkg_postinst() {
ebegin "Running 'openssl rehash ${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs' to rebuild hashes (bug #333069)"
openssl rehash "${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs"
eend $?
}