dev-libs/openssl: drop 1.1.1t-r3

Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/903545
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/907413
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
This commit is contained in:
Sam James
2023-06-14 06:20:25 +01:00
parent 6a593ae96e
commit 6c4610dbaf
5 changed files with 0 additions and 575 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
DIST openssl-1.0.2-patches-1.5.tar.xz 12404 BLAKE2B 6c1b8c28f339f539b2ab8643379502a24cf62bffde00041dce54d5dd9e8d2620b181362ee5464b0ab32ba4948e209697bfabadbea2944a409a1009100d298f24 SHA512 5725e2d9d1ee8cc074bcef3bed61c71bdab2ff1c114362110c3fb8da11ad5bc8f2ff28e90a293f5f3a5cf96ecda54dffdb7ab3fb3f8b23ef6472250dc3037659
DIST openssl-1.0.2t-bindist-1.0.tar.xz 13872 BLAKE2B b2aade96a6e0ca6209a39e205b1c838de945903fcf959c62cc29ddcd1a0cb360fc5db234df86860a6a4c096f5ecc237611e4c2946b986a5500c24ba93c208ef4 SHA512 a48a7efb9b973b865bcc5009d450b428ed6b4b95e4cefe70c51056e47392c8a7bec58215168d8b07712419dc74646c2bd2fd23bcfbba2031376e292249a6b1b6
DIST openssl-1.0.2u.tar.gz 5355412 BLAKE2B b2ff2a10e5851af5aca4093422a9a072c794e87b997263826c1c35910c040f695fac63decac5856cb49399ed03d410f97701d9fd4e1ebfbcacd8f3a74ce8bf57 SHA512 c455bb309e20e2c2d47fdc5619c734d107d5c8c38c1409903ce979acc120b0d5fa0312917c0aa0d630e402d092a703d4249643f36078e8528a3cafc9dac6ab32
DIST openssl-1.1.1t.tar.gz 9881866 BLAKE2B 66d76ea0c05a4afc3104e22602cffc2373e857728625d31ab3244881cafa91c099a817a09def7746bce4133585bfc90b769f43527e77a81ed13e60a8c2fb4d8d SHA512 628676c9c3bc1cf46083d64f61943079f97f0eefd0264042e40a85dbbd988f271bfe01cd1135d22cc3f67a298f1d078041f8f2e97b0da0d93fe172da573da18c
DIST openssl-1.1.1t.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B fc5e7069268e987a20241dfc4f080529c6e95e217c198568b09c833e390e68b25a604a5d3ec29c6a64b9dee9d42199fd3647214e536ba2f7b8b4e57aa4cba680 SHA512 1232a94fce991d62f008ae6d3d9b6fe68cb6378fe07450feb17a58eb2417fb385ffcb7e6b74eb683134be9ff6ccf6efa183f37f4dd521614fd5aeaddf000b90b
DIST openssl-1.1.1u.tar.gz 9892176 BLAKE2B 5de9cb856e497596ecba008bad6515eefd093849b9c66dd7447031723996f3ba66ac37a323a5f7d01b1d42df4daaceb523372f5897d5c53b935ffab91c566594 SHA512 d00aeb0b4c4676deff06ff95af7ac33dd683b92f972b4a8ae55cf384bb37c7ec30ab83c6c0745daf87cf1743a745fced6a347fd11fed4c548aa0953610ed4919
DIST openssl-1.1.1u.tar.gz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 7a978a94264a14be04372fea39868e9177e8a0b0f24344267702022e19ee0f52e91ad141d7c54da870f7ec0df9b2e43b80939f1d274dd0b44d36da2670e3a468 SHA512 40245d65ace95b2002bf64bcba184c92fec3420b08d9f61f3a709c4842e9478595105d8adce33a08eb98d351d2a0989ec342b08cdd9104498ea0543b6e592d28
DIST openssl-3.0.9.tar.gz 15181285 BLAKE2B cc1df41fa12ba4443e15e94f6ebdc5e103b9dab5eab2e1c8f74e6a74fa2c38207817921b65d7293cb241c190a910191c7163600bb75243adde0e2f9ec31cc885 SHA512 86c99146b37236419b110db77dd3ac3992e6bed78c258f0cc3434ca233460b4e17c0ac81d7058547fe9cb72a9fd80ee56d4b4916bb731dbe2bbcf1c3d46bf31a
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
commit 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b
Author: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
Date: Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100
x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.
Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
};
struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_count;
+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
+ size_t node_maximum;
+
/* This is the tree 'level' data */
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
int nlevel;
@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data);
void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+ int extra_data)
{
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
+ return NULL;
+
node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
if (node == NULL) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
node->data = data;
node->parent = parent;
- if (level) {
+ if (level != NULL) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
if (level->anyPolicy)
goto node_error;
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
- if (tree) {
+ if (extra_data) {
if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
}
}
+ tree->node_count++;
if (parent)
parent->nchild++;
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
#include "pcy_local.h"
+/*
+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
+ *
+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
+#endif
+
/*
* Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
* evaluation.
@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
}
+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
+
/*
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
*
@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
level = tree->levels;
if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
goto bad_tree;
- if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
policy_data_free(data);
goto bad_tree;
}
@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
*/
static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
int i, matched = 0;
@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
matched = 1;
}
}
if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
- if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
{
int i;
@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
policy_data_free(data);
return 0;
}
@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
}
/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
if (last->anyPolicy &&
- level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
}
if (!tree->user_policies) {
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
commit b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000
Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs
Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
- int i;
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
continue;
+ cbcalled = 1;
if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
return 0;
}
+ if (!cbcalled) {
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
return 1;
}
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
commit 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a
Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100
Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
+policy checking.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect.
The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-269
View File
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2023 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=8
VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH="${BROOT}"/usr/share/openpgp-keys/openssl.org.asc
inherit edo flag-o-matic toolchain-funcs multilib-minimal verify-sig
MY_P=${P/_/-}
DESCRIPTION="Full-strength general purpose cryptography library (including SSL and TLS)"
HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssl.org/"
SRC_URI="mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz
verify-sig? ( mirror://openssl/source/${MY_P}.tar.gz.asc )"
S="${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}"
LICENSE="openssl"
SLOT="0/1.1" # .so version of libssl/libcrypto
if [[ ${PV} != *_pre* ]] ; then
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm arm64 hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 sparc x86 ~amd64-linux ~x86-linux ~arm64-macos ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x64-solaris"
fi
IUSE="+asm rfc3779 sctp cpu_flags_x86_sse2 sslv3 static-libs test tls-compression tls-heartbeat vanilla verify-sig weak-ssl-ciphers"
RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
RDEPEND="
tls-compression? ( >=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.8-r1[static-libs(+)?,${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )"
DEPEND="${RDEPEND}"
BDEPEND="
>=dev-lang/perl-5
sctp? ( >=net-misc/lksctp-tools-1.0.12 )
test? (
sys-apps/diffutils
sys-devel/bc
kernel_linux? ( sys-process/procps )
)
verify-sig? ( >=sec-keys/openpgp-keys-openssl-20230207 )"
PDEPEND="app-misc/ca-certificates"
# force upgrade to prevent broken login, bug #696950
RDEPEND+=" !<net-misc/openssh-8.0_p1-r3"
MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
usr/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
)
PATCHES=(
# General patches which are suitable to always apply
# If they're Gentoo specific, add to USE=-vanilla logic in src_prepare!
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.1.0j-parallel_install_fix.patch # bug #671602
"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-1.1.1i-riscv32.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-1.1.1t-CVE-2023-0464.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-1.1.1t-CVE-2023-0465.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/openssl-1.1.1t-CVE-2023-0466.patch
)
pkg_setup() {
[[ ${MERGE_TYPE} == binary ]] && return
# must check in pkg_setup; sysctl doesn't work with userpriv!
if use test && use sctp; then
# test_ssl_new will fail with "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled in kernel"
# if sctp.auth_enable is not enabled.
local sctp_auth_status=$(sysctl -n net.sctp.auth_enable 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -z "${sctp_auth_status}" ]] || [[ ${sctp_auth_status} != 1 ]]; then
die "FEATURES=test with USE=sctp requires net.sctp.auth_enable=1!"
fi
fi
}
src_unpack() {
# Can delete this once test fix patch is dropped
if use verify-sig ; then
# Needed for downloaded patch (which is unsigned, which is fine)
verify-sig_verify_detached "${DISTDIR}"/${P}.tar.gz{,.asc}
fi
default
}
src_prepare() {
# Make sure we only ever touch Makefile.org and avoid patching a file
# that gets blown away anyways by the Configure script in src_configure
rm -f Makefile
if ! use vanilla ; then
PATCHES+=(
# Add patches which are Gentoo-specific customisations here
)
fi
default
if use test && use sctp && has network-sandbox ${FEATURES}; then
einfo "Disabling test '80-test_ssl_new.t' which is known to fail with FEATURES=network-sandbox ..."
rm test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t || die
fi
# Test fails depending on kernel configuration, bug #699134
rm test/recipes/30-test_afalg.t || die
# Remove test target when FEATURES=test isn't set
if ! use test ; then
sed \
-e '/^$config{dirs}/s@ "test",@@' \
-i Configure || die
fi
if use prefix && [[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] ; then
# use GNU ld full option, not to confuse it on Solaris
sed -i \
-e 's/-Wl,-M,/-Wl,--version-script=/' \
-e 's/-Wl,-h,/-Wl,--soname=/' \
Configurations/10-main.conf || die
fi
# The config script does stupid stuff to prompt the user. Kill it.
sed -i '/stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste/d' config || die
}
src_configure() {
# Keep this in sync with app-misc/c_rehash
SSL_CNF_DIR="/etc/ssl"
# Quiet out unknown driver argument warnings since openssl
# doesn't have well-split CFLAGS and we're making it even worse
# and 'make depend' uses -Werror for added fun (bug #417795 again)
tc-is-clang && append-flags -Qunused-arguments
# We really, really need to build OpenSSL w/ strict aliasing disabled.
# It's filled with violations and it *will* result in miscompiled
# code. This has been in the ebuild for > 10 years but even in 2022,
# it's still relevant:
# - https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/55255
# - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18225
# - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663#issuecomment-1181478057
# Don't remove the no strict aliasing bits below!
filter-flags -fstrict-aliasing
append-flags -fno-strict-aliasing
# The OpenSSL developers don't test with LTO right now, it leads to various
# warnings/errors (which may or may not be false positives), it's considered
# unsupported, and it's not tested in CI: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/18663.
filter-lto
append-cppflags -DOPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
append-flags $(test-flags-CC -Wa,--noexecstack)
# bug #197996
unset APPS
# bug #312551
unset SCRIPTS
# bug #311473
unset CROSS_COMPILE
tc-export AR CC CXX RANLIB RC
multilib-minimal_src_configure
}
multilib_src_configure() {
use_ssl() { usex $1 "enable-${2:-$1}" "no-${2:-$1}" " ${*:3}" ; }
local krb5=$(has_version app-crypt/mit-krb5 && echo "MIT" || echo "Heimdal")
# See if our toolchain supports __uint128_t. If so, it's 64bit
# friendly and can use the nicely optimized code paths, bug #460790.
#local ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
#
# Disable it for now though (bug #469976)
# Do NOT re-enable without substantial discussion first!
#
#echo "__uint128_t i;" > "${T}"/128.c
#if ${CC} ${CFLAGS} -c "${T}"/128.c -o /dev/null >&/dev/null ; then
# ec_nistp_64_gcc_128="enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128"
#fi
local sslout=$(bash "${FILESDIR}/gentoo.config-1.0.4")
einfo "Use configuration ${sslout:-(openssl knows best)}"
local config=( perl "${S}/Configure" )
[[ -z ${sslout} ]] && config=( sh "${S}/config" -v )
# "disable-deprecated" option breaks too many consumers.
# Don't set it without thorough revdeps testing.
# Make sure user flags don't get added *yet* to avoid duplicated
# flags.
local myeconfargs=(
${sslout}
$(use cpu_flags_x86_sse2 || echo "no-sse2")
enable-camellia
enable-ec
enable-ec2m
enable-sm2
enable-srp
$(use elibc_musl && echo "no-async")
${ec_nistp_64_gcc_128}
enable-idea
enable-mdc2
enable-rc5
$(use_ssl sslv3 ssl3)
$(use_ssl sslv3 ssl3-method)
$(use_ssl asm)
$(use_ssl rfc3779)
$(use_ssl sctp)
$(use test || echo "no-tests")
$(use_ssl tls-compression zlib)
$(use_ssl tls-heartbeat heartbeats)
$(use_ssl weak-ssl-ciphers)
--prefix="${EPREFIX}"/usr
--openssldir="${EPREFIX}"${SSL_CNF_DIR}
--libdir=$(get_libdir)
shared
threads
)
edo "${config[@]}" "${myeconfargs[@]}"
}
multilib_src_compile() {
emake all
}
multilib_src_test() {
emake -j1 test
}
multilib_src_install() {
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_sw
if multilib_is_native_abi; then
emake DESTDIR="${D}" install_ssldirs
emake DESTDIR="${D}" DOCDIR='$(INSTALLTOP)'/share/doc/${PF} MANSUFFIX=ssl install_docs
fi
# This is crappy in that the static archives are still built even
# when USE=static-libs. But this is due to a failing in the openssl
# build system: the static archives are built as PIC all the time.
# Only way around this would be to manually configure+compile openssl
# twice; once with shared lib support enabled and once without.
if ! use static-libs; then
rm "${ED}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/lib{crypto,ssl}.a || die
fi
}
multilib_src_install_all() {
# openssl installs perl version of c_rehash by default, but
# we provide a shell version via app-misc/c_rehash
rm "${ED}"/usr/bin/c_rehash || die
dodoc CHANGES* FAQ NEWS README doc/*.txt doc/${PN}-c-indent.el
# Create the certs directory
keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs
# bug #254521
dodir /etc/sandbox.d
echo 'SANDBOX_PREDICT="/dev/crypto"' > "${ED}"/etc/sandbox.d/10openssl
diropts -m0700
keepdir ${SSL_CNF_DIR}/private
}
pkg_postinst() {
ebegin "Running 'openssl rehash ${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs' to rebuild hashes (bug #333069)"
openssl rehash "${EROOT}${SSL_CNF_DIR}/certs"
eend $?
}