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sys-apps/shadow: drop 4.13-r4

Browse Source 
Signed-off-by: Christopher Bayliss <cjbdev@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
This commit is contained in:
Christopher Bayliss
2024-05-24 10:55:35 +10:00
committed by Sam James
parent 7db0c7da60
commit c356f80263
6 changed files with 0 additions and 580 deletions
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2
sys-apps/shadow/Manifest
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@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
DIST shadow-4.13.tar.xz 1762908 BLAKE2B 315ab8a7e598aeefb50c11293e20cfa0982c3c3ae21c35ae243d09a4facf97a13c1d672990876e74ef94f5284402acf14997663743e2aaefa6cfc4369b7d24dc SHA512 2949a728c3312bef13d23138d6b79caf402781b1cb179e33b5be546c1790971ec20778d0e9cd3dbe09691d928ffcbe88e60da42fab58c69a90d5ebe5e3e2ab8e
DIST shadow-4.13.tar.xz.asc 488 BLAKE2B de1f8285c5713a772343a2a7c638d1d13429dd4fa867d4f91d4922aa0d083b4a3110d38e8a8ab82137fdf4fecb12ba3677f3fb235401fc6438ae663fbd9bfbd2 SHA512 f8549c4e699c65721d53946d61b6127712572f7ad9ee13018ef3a25307002992aa727471c948d1bb22dcddf112715bed387d28f436123f30e153ae6bc0cd3648
DIST shadow-4.14.2.tar.xz 1799548 BLAKE2B 419f0a516753616ef691f71ec9002eef6fd7568c013ac71900d7481eff1bd9165c69d9587b7ca25800543a2eac58cfb7ce4224063e8af7b278f589640485c28f SHA512 b417dbe0fbbeced1022e64efe9dcd8b41d14779c45163e6de63891ac63f837d43f3e559f99f884099aa45282299ceb4dcb9fd29d21c9925687ff8462fe6ead2f
DIST shadow-4.14.2.tar.xz.asc 833 BLAKE2B 9e085c79ccd3aa77489eb92e947dd4875dea84be2dbcbd2b8443e70b3dc065d288171ee024f81c6c3bf44d0ebfcabbb69937a906fdb26b6622d5a369aa415e8e SHA512 47a2607fa782a48b0333e353343a32f358115bb40225ea962fab86d4a8dbed1df976eb6231baf5b95f34a13139b99d6b719521626e5d3e9c80fc4c685767d9b7
DIST shadow-4.14.6.tar.xz 1805900 BLAKE2B e910131eab6527c1222afadf02ebd7bd6a3460baf95c23cc9eefa7aa21ddb70c02e58e4f58db2cb24fa8e2996c82b11664420545a8b1af573e4e6a25ceb3f921 SHA512 994a81afbafb19622a1d0f84527f96a84b0955c4ffa5e826682ead82af7940b8e3a091514bd2075622ebdf7638643c9c6b6b7ac3e48d985278db896249d70ae6

100
sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-CVE-2023-29383.patch
View File

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
---
lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
index 640be931f..fb51b5829 100644
--- a/lib/fields.c
+++ b/lib/fields.c
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
*
* The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
* characters.
- * + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
- * + 1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
- * contains a non-printable character.
+ * + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
+ * + 1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
+ * but the field contains a non-printable character.
* + 0 is returned otherwise.
*/
int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
}
if (0 == err) {
- /* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
if (!isprint (*cp)) {
err = 1;
+ }
+ if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
+ err = -1;
break;
}
}
From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
characters that are not control ones.
Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
checking functions to avoid UB.
Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
---
lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
index fb51b5829..539292485 100644
--- a/lib/fields.c
+++ b/lib/fields.c
@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
* of illegal characters. */
+ if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
- if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
+ unsigned char c = *cp;
+ if (!isprint (c)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (iscntrl (c)) {
err = -1;
break;
}
}
- if (0 == err) {
- /* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
- if (!isprint (*cp)) {
- err = 1;
- }
- if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
- err = -1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
return err;
}

38
sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-configure-clang16.patch
View File

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/a281f241b592aec636d1b93a99e764499d68c7ef
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/595
From a281f241b592aec636d1b93a99e764499d68c7ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 11:52:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix HAVE_SHADOWGRP configure check
The missing #include <gshadow.h> causes the configure check to fail
spuriously, resulting in HAVE_SHADOWGRP not being defined even
on systems that actually have sgetsgent (such as current glibc).
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
#include <shadow.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
+ #include <gshadow.h>
+ #endif
+ int
main()
{
struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -15684,6 +15684,10 @@ else $as_nop
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <shadow.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
+ #include <gshadow.h>
+ #endif
+ int
main()
{
struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");

135
sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-password-leak.patch
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@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904
From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
How to trigger this password leak?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
for confirming the new password). Each of those 2 password prompts
uses agetpass() to get the password. If the second agetpass() fails,
the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
can fail for any of the following reasons:
- malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
These are going to be difficult to trigger. Maybe getting the system
to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
files.
- The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
The is plausible with physical access. However, at that point, a
keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
introduced, which is not going to be easy.
How to read the password after the leak?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
be doable. Try to find some consistent patterns.
Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
leaks their password.
Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
password.
On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
>
> - brk / sbrk
> - mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
> - mmap /dev/zero
> - mmap some other file
> - shm_open
> - shmget
>
> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process. Using mmap of an
> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
> into the memory space on the first use.
>
> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED. This is rare.
>
> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
> process. It isn't leftover from other processes.
>
> The avenues available for reading the memory:
> - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
> - /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
> - ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
> - causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
>
> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
How to fix it?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
allowed to impede this zeroing.
This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
the string somewhere hidden in the stack. Those copies won't get zeroed
by explicit_bzero(3). However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3). But we all know that
sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
this is plausible. Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
text.
Security concerns
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We believe this isn't easy to exploit. Nevertheless, and since the fix
is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
imagination than us to find a way.
Affected versions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
All. Bug introduced in shadow 19990709. That's the second commit in
the git history.
Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
--- a/src/gpasswd.c
+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
@@ -898,6 +898,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
erase_pass (cp);
cp = agetpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
if (NULL == cp) {
+ memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
exit (1);
}

33
sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.13-usermod-prefix-gid.patch
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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
https://bugs.gentoo.org/903083
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/691
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/bd2d0079c90241f24671a7946a3ad175dc1a3aeb
From fcb04de38a0ddc263288a1c450b35bfb1503d523 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2023 21:16:55 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] usermod: respect --prefix for --gid option
The --gid option accepts a group name or id. When a name is provided, it
is resolved to an id by looking up the name in the group database
(/etc/group).
The --prefix option overides the location of the passwd and group
databases. I suspect the --gid option was overlooked when wiring up the
--prefix option.
useradd --gid already respects --prefix; this change makes usermod
behave the same way.
Fixes: b6b2c756c91806b1c3e150ea0ee4721c6cdaf9d0
Signed-off-by: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org>
--- a/src/usermod.c
+++ b/src/usermod.c
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
fflg = true;
break;
case 'g':
- grp = getgr_nam_gid (optarg);
+ grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (optarg);
if (NULL == grp) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: group '%s' does not exist\n"),

272
sys-apps/shadow/shadow-4.13-r4.ebuild
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@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 1999-2024 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=8
# Upstream sometimes pushes releases as pre-releases before marking them
# official. Don't keyword the pre-releases!
# Check https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases.
VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH=/usr/share/openpgp-keys/sergehallyn.asc
inherit libtool pam verify-sig
DESCRIPTION="Utilities to deal with user accounts"
HOMEPAGE="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow"
SRC_URI="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/${PV}/${P}.tar.xz"
SRC_URI+=" verify-sig? ( https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/${PV}/${P}.tar.xz.asc )"
LICENSE="BSD GPL-2"
# Subslot is for libsubid's SONAME.
SLOT="0/4"
KEYWORDS="~alpha amd64 arm arm64 hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ppc ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 sparc x86"
IUSE="acl audit bcrypt cracklib nls pam selinux skey split-usr su xattr"
# Taken from the man/Makefile.am file.
LANGS=( cs da de es fi fr hu id it ja ko pl pt_BR ru sv tr zh_CN zh_TW )
REQUIRED_USE="?? ( cracklib pam )"
COMMON_DEPEND="
virtual/libcrypt:=
acl? ( sys-apps/acl:= )
audit? ( >=sys-process/audit-2.6:= )
cracklib? ( >=sys-libs/cracklib-2.7-r3:= )
nls? ( virtual/libintl )
pam? ( sys-libs/pam:= )
skey? ( sys-auth/skey:= )
selinux? (
>=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28:=
sys-libs/libsemanage:=
)
xattr? ( sys-apps/attr:= )
"
DEPEND="
${COMMON_DEPEND}
>=sys-kernel/linux-headers-4.14
"
RDEPEND="
${COMMON_DEPEND}
!<sys-apps/man-pages-5.11-r1
!=sys-apps/man-pages-5.12-r0
!=sys-apps/man-pages-5.12-r1
nls? (
!<app-i18n/man-pages-it-5.06-r1
!<app-i18n/man-pages-ja-20180315-r1
!<app-i18n/man-pages-ru-5.03.2390.2390.20191017-r1
)
pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20150213 )
su? ( !sys-apps/util-linux[su(-)] )
"
BDEPEND="
app-arch/xz-utils
sys-devel/gettext
verify-sig? ( sec-keys/openpgp-keys-sergehallyn )
"
PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-configure-clang16.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2023-29383.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-usermod-prefix-gid.patch
"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-password-leak.patch
)
src_prepare() {
default
elibtoolize
}
src_configure() {
local myeconfargs=(
--disable-account-tools-setuid
--disable-static
--with-btrfs
--without-group-name-max-length
--without-tcb
$(use_enable nls)
$(use_with acl)
$(use_with audit)
$(use_with bcrypt)
$(use_with cracklib libcrack)
$(use_with elibc_glibc nscd)
$(use_with pam libpam)
$(use_with selinux)
$(use_with skey)
$(use_with su)
$(use_with xattr attr)
)
econf "${myeconfargs[@]}"
if use nls ; then
local l langs="po" # These are the pot files.
for l in ${LANGS[*]} ; do
has ${l} ${LINGUAS-${l}} && langs+=" ${l}"
done
sed -i "/^SUBDIRS = /s:=.*:= ${langs}:" man/Makefile || die
fi
}
set_login_opt() {
local comment="" opt=${1} val=${2}
if [[ -z ${val} ]]; then
comment="#"
sed -i \
-e "/^${opt}\>/s:^:#:" \
"${ED}"/etc/login.defs || die
else
sed -i -r \
-e "/^#?${opt}\>/s:.*:${opt} ${val}:" \
"${ED}"/etc/login.defs
fi
local res=$(grep "^${comment}${opt}\>" "${ED}"/etc/login.defs)
einfo "${res:-Unable to find ${opt} in /etc/login.defs}"
}
src_install() {
emake DESTDIR="${D}" suidperms=4711 install
# 4.9 regression: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/389
emake DESTDIR="${D}" -C man install
find "${ED}" -name '*.la' -type f -delete || die
insinto /etc
if ! use pam ; then
insopts -m0600
doins etc/login.access etc/limits
fi
# needed for 'useradd -D'
insinto /etc/default
insopts -m0600
doins "${FILESDIR}"/default/useradd
if use split-usr ; then
# move passwd to / to help recover broke systems #64441
# We cannot simply remove this or else net-misc/scponly
# and other tools will break because of hardcoded passwd
# location
dodir /bin
mv "${ED}"/usr/bin/passwd "${ED}"/bin/ || die
dosym ../../bin/passwd /usr/bin/passwd
fi
cd "${S}" || die
insinto /etc
insopts -m0644
newins etc/login.defs login.defs
set_login_opt CREATE_HOME yes
if ! use pam ; then
set_login_opt MAIL_CHECK_ENAB no
set_login_opt SU_WHEEL_ONLY yes
set_login_opt CRACKLIB_DICTPATH /usr/lib/cracklib_dict
set_login_opt LOGIN_RETRIES 3
set_login_opt ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
set_login_opt CONSOLE
else
dopamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/shadow
for x in chsh chfn ; do
newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/passwd ${x}
done
for x in chpasswd newusers ; do
newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/chpasswd ${x}
done
newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/pam.d-include/shadow-r1 groupmems
# Comment out login.defs options that pam hates
local opt sed_args=()
for opt in \
CHFN_AUTH \
CONSOLE \
CRACKLIB_DICTPATH \
ENV_HZ \
ENVIRON_FILE \
FAILLOG_ENAB \
FTMP_FILE \
LASTLOG_ENAB \
MAIL_CHECK_ENAB \
MOTD_FILE \
NOLOGINS_FILE \
OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB \
PASS_ALWAYS_WARN \
PASS_CHANGE_TRIES \
PASS_MIN_LEN \
PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB \
QUOTAS_ENAB \
SU_WHEEL_ONLY
do
set_login_opt ${opt}
sed_args+=( -e "/^#${opt}\>/b pamnote" )
done
sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" \
-e 'b exit' \
-e ': pamnote; i# NOTE: This setting should be configured via /etc/pam.d/ and not in this file.' \
-e ': exit' \
"${ED}"/etc/login.defs || die
# Remove manpages that pam will install for us
# and/or don't apply when using pam
find "${ED}"/usr/share/man -type f \
'(' -name 'limits.5*' -o -name 'suauth.5*' ')' \
-delete
# Remove pam.d files provided by pambase.
rm "${ED}"/etc/pam.d/{login,passwd} || die
if use su ; then
rm "${ED}"/etc/pam.d/su || die
fi
fi
# Remove manpages that are handled by other packages
find "${ED}"/usr/share/man -type f \
'(' -name id.1 -o -name getspnam.3 ')' \
-delete || die
if ! use su ; then
find "${ED}"/usr/share/man -type f -name su.1 -delete || die
fi
cd "${S}" || die
dodoc ChangeLog NEWS TODO
newdoc README README.download
cd doc || die
dodoc HOWTO README* WISHLIST *.txt
if use elibc_musl; then
QA_CONFIG_IMPL_DECL_SKIP+=( sgetsgent )
fi
}
pkg_preinst() {
rm -f "${EROOT}"/etc/pam.d/system-auth.new \
"${EROOT}/etc/login.defs.new"
}
pkg_postinst() {
# Missing entries from /etc/passwd can cause odd system blips.
# See bug #829872.
if ! pwck -r -q -R "${EROOT:-/}" &>/dev/null ; then
ewarn "Running 'pwck' returned errors. Please run it manually to fix any errors."
fi
# Enable shadow groups.
if [[ ! -f "${EROOT}"/etc/gshadow ]] ; then
if grpck -r -R "${EROOT:-/}" 2>/dev/null ; then
grpconv -R "${EROOT:-/}"
else
ewarn "Running 'grpck' returned errors. Please run it by hand, and then"
ewarn "run 'grpconv' afterwards!"
fi
fi
[[ ! -f "${EROOT}"/etc/subgid ]] &&
touch "${EROOT}"/etc/subgid
[[ ! -f "${EROOT}"/etc/subuid ]] &&
touch "${EROOT}"/etc/subuid
einfo "The 'adduser' symlink to 'useradd' has been dropped."
}