sys-devel/patch: rev bump to add some patches

Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/690136 Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.71, Repoman-2.3.17 Signed-off-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org>
2026-08-06 00:48:18 -07:00 · 2019-08-16 14:38:46 +02:00
parent e11ab933be
commit b4e5bfd9d4
7 changed files with 446 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-Avoid-invalid-memory-access-in-context-format-diffs.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-Avoid-invalid-memory-access-in-context-format-diffs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 15b158db3ae11cb835f2eb8d2eb48e09d1a4af48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 19:10:02 +0200
+Subject: Avoid invalid memory access in context format diffs
+
+* src/pch.c (another_hunk): Avoid invalid memory access in context format
+diffs.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index a500ad9..cb54e03 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev)
+ 		  ptrn_prefix_context = context;
+ 		ptrn_suffix_context = context;
+ 		if (repl_beginning
+		    || p_end <= 0
+ 		    || (p_end
+ 			!= p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n')))
+ 		  {
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix1.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 19599883ffb6a450d2884f081f8ecf68edbed7ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 14:31:55 +0200
+Subject: Don't leak temporary file on failed ed-style patch
+
+Now that we write ed-style patches to a temporary file before we
+apply them, we need to ensure that the temporary file is removed
+before we leave, even on fatal error.
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Use global TMPEDNAME instead of local
+  tmpname. Don't unlink the file directly, instead tag it for removal
+  at exit time.
+* src/patch.c (cleanup): Unlink TMPEDNAME at exit.
+
+This closes bug #53820:
+https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53820
+
+Fixes: 123eaff0d5d1 ("Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches (CVE-2018-1000156)")
+---
+ src/common.h |  2 ++
+ src/patch.c  |  1 +
+ src/pch.c    | 11 +++++------
+ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common.h b/src/common.h
+index 904a3f8..53c5e32 100644
+--- a/src/common.h
+++ b/src/common.h
+@@ -94,10 +94,12 @@ XTERN char const *origsuff;
+ XTERN char const * TMPINNAME;
+ XTERN char const * TMPOUTNAME;
+ XTERN char const * TMPPATNAME;
+XTERN char const * TMPEDNAME;
+ 
+ XTERN bool TMPINNAME_needs_removal;
+ XTERN bool TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal;
+ XTERN bool TMPPATNAME_needs_removal;
+XTERN bool TMPEDNAME_needs_removal;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUGGING
+ XTERN int debug;
+diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c
+index 3fcaec5..9146597 100644
+--- a/src/patch.c
+++ b/src/patch.c
+@@ -2003,6 +2003,7 @@ cleanup (void)
+   remove_if_needed (TMPINNAME, &TMPINNAME_needs_removal);
+   remove_if_needed (TMPOUTNAME, &TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal);
+   remove_if_needed (TMPPATNAME, &TMPPATNAME_needs_removal);
+  remove_if_needed (TMPEDNAME, &TMPEDNAME_needs_removal);
+   remove_if_needed (TMPREJNAME, &TMPREJNAME_needs_removal);
+   output_files (NULL);
+ }
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index 79a3c99..1bb3153 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2392,7 +2392,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+     file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
+     size_t chars_read;
+     FILE *tmpfp = 0;
+-    char const *tmpname;
+     int tmpfd;
+     pid_t pid;
+ 
+@@ -2404,12 +2403,13 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	   invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
+ 	   can lead to arbitrary command execution.  */
+ 
+-	tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
+	tmpfd = make_tempfile (&TMPEDNAME, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
+ 	if (tmpfd == -1)
+-	  pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+	  pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME));
+	TMPEDNAME_needs_removal = true;
+ 	tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
+ 	if (! tmpfp)
+-	  pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+	  pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME));
+       }
+ 
+     for (;;) {
+@@ -2449,7 +2449,7 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+       write_fatal ();
+ 
+     if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
+-      pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
+      pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (TMPEDNAME));
+ 
+     if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
+ 	int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
+@@ -2482,7 +2482,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+     }
+ 
+     fclose (tmpfp);
+-    safe_unlink (tmpname);
+ 
+     if (ofp)
+       {
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix2.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 369dcccdfa6336e5a873d6d63705cfbe04c55727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 15:14:45 +0200
+Subject: Don't leak temporary file on failed multi-file ed-style patch
+
+The previous fix worked fine with single-file ed-style patches, but
+would still leak temporary files in the case of multi-file ed-style
+patch. Fix that case as well, and extend the test case to check for
+it.
+
+* src/patch.c (main): Unlink TMPEDNAME if needed before moving to
+  the next file in a patch.
+
+This closes bug #53820:
+https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53820
+
+Fixes: 123eaff0d5d1 ("Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches (CVE-2018-1000156)")
+Fixes: 19599883ffb6 ("Don't leak temporary file on failed ed-style patch")
+---
+ src/patch.c    |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c
+index 9146597..81c7a02 100644
+--- a/src/patch.c
+++ b/src/patch.c
+@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	    }
+ 	  remove_if_needed (TMPOUTNAME, &TMPOUTNAME_needs_removal);
+ 	}
+      remove_if_needed (TMPEDNAME, &TMPEDNAME_needs_removal);
+ 
+       if (! skip_rest_of_patch && ! file_type)
+ 	{
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks.  So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+---
+ src/inp.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/inp.c b/src/inp.c
+index 32d0919..22d7473 100644
+--- a/src/inp.c
+++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+     {
+       if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+         {
+-	  int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
+	  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ 	  size_t buffered = 0, n;
+	  int ifd;
+
+	  if (! follow_symlinks)
+	    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+	  ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ 	  if (ifd < 0)
+ 	    pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ 
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
+  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+   int ifd;
+   FILE *ifp;
+   int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ 
+   if (instat.st_size == 0)
+     filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+-  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
+  if (! follow_symlinks)
+    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+       || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+     pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+   if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index 1cc08ba..fb38307 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
+ 
+ 	  try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ 	  safe_unlink (bakname);
+-	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ 		pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -584,10 +584,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_flags, mode_t mode,
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
+  int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+   int fromfd;
+   ssize_t i;
+ 
+-  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
+  if (! follow_symlinks)
+    from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+   while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+     {
+@@ -630,6 +633,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+   else
+     {
+       assert (S_ISREG (mode));
+      if (! follow_symlinks)
+	to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+       tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ 			  to_dir_known_to_exist);
+       copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -645,9 +650,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const *to, struct stat *tost,
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
+  int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+   int tofd;
+ 
+-  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
+  if (! follow_symlinks)
+    to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+   copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+   if (close (tofd) != 0)
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13638.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13638.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c
+index 4fd5a05..16e001a 100644
+--- a/src/pch.c
+++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ 	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ 	  }
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+ 	fflush (stdout);
+ 
+ 	pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
+ 	else if (pid == 0)
+ 	  {
+ 	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+-	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
+	    assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
+	    execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char  *) NULL);
+ 	    _exit (2);
+ 	  }
+ 	else
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-Do-not-crash-when-RLIMIT_NOFILE-is-set-to-RLIM_INFINITY.patch
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/files/patch-2.7.6-Do-not-crash-when-RLIMIT_NOFILE-is-set-to-RLIM_INFINITY.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From 61d7788b83b302207a67b82786f4fd79e3538f30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 11:10:43 +0200
+Subject: Don't crash when RLIMIT_NOFILE is set to RLIM_INFINITY
+
+* src/safe.c (min_cached_fds): Define minimum number of cached dir file
+descriptors.
+(max_cached_fds): Change type to rlim_t to allow storing RLIM_INFINITY.
+(init_dirfd_cache): Set max_cached_fds to RLIM_INFINITY when RLIMIT_NOFILE is
+RLIM_INFINITY.  Set the initial hash table size to min_cached_fds, independent
+of RLIMIT_NOFILE: patches commonly only affect one or a few files, so a small
+hash table will usually suffice; if needed, the hash table will grow.
+(insert_cached_dirfd): Don't shrink the cache when max_cached_fds is
+RLIM_INFINITY.
+---
+ src/safe.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/safe.c b/src/safe.c
+index 5a7202f..f147b0e 100644
+--- a/src/safe.c
+++ b/src/safe.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ struct cached_dirfd {
+ };
+ 
+ static Hash_table *cached_dirfds = NULL;
+-static size_t max_cached_fds;
+static rlim_t min_cached_fds = 8;
+static rlim_t max_cached_fds;
+ LIST_HEAD (lru_list);
+ 
+ static size_t hash_cached_dirfd (const void *entry, size_t table_size)
+@@ -98,11 +99,17 @@ static void init_dirfd_cache (void)
+ {
+   struct rlimit nofile;
+ 
+-  max_cached_fds = 8;
+   if (getrlimit (RLIMIT_NOFILE, &nofile) == 0)
+-    max_cached_fds = MAX (nofile.rlim_cur / 4, max_cached_fds);
+    {
+      if (nofile.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
+        max_cached_fds = RLIM_INFINITY;
+      else
+	max_cached_fds = MAX (nofile.rlim_cur / 4, min_cached_fds);
+    }
+  else
+    max_cached_fds = min_cached_fds;
+ 
+-  cached_dirfds = hash_initialize (max_cached_fds,
+  cached_dirfds = hash_initialize (min_cached_fds,
+ 				   NULL,
+ 				   hash_cached_dirfd,
+ 				   compare_cached_dirfds,
+@@ -148,20 +155,23 @@ static void insert_cached_dirfd (struct cached_dirfd *entry, int keepfd)
+   if (cached_dirfds == NULL)
+     init_dirfd_cache ();
+ 
+-  /* Trim off the least recently used entries */
+-  while (hash_get_n_entries (cached_dirfds) >= max_cached_fds)
+  if (max_cached_fds != RLIM_INFINITY)
+     {
+-      struct cached_dirfd *last =
+-	list_entry (lru_list.prev, struct cached_dirfd, lru_link);
+-      if (&last->lru_link == &lru_list)
+-	break;
+-      if (last->fd == keepfd)
+      /* Trim off the least recently used entries */
+      while (hash_get_n_entries (cached_dirfds) >= max_cached_fds)
+ 	{
+-	  last = list_entry (last->lru_link.prev, struct cached_dirfd, lru_link);
+	  struct cached_dirfd *last =
+	    list_entry (lru_list.prev, struct cached_dirfd, lru_link);
+ 	  if (&last->lru_link == &lru_list)
+ 	    break;
+	  if (last->fd == keepfd)
+	    {
+	      last = list_entry (last->lru_link.prev, struct cached_dirfd, lru_link);
+	      if (&last->lru_link == &lru_list)
+		break;
+	    }
+	  remove_cached_dirfd (last);
+ 	}
+-      remove_cached_dirfd (last);
+     }
+ 
+   /* Only insert if the parent still exists. */
+-- 
+cgit v1.0-41-gc330
+
--- a/sys-devel/patch/patch-2.7.6-r4.ebuild
+++ b/sys-devel/patch/patch-2.7.6-r4.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI="7"
+
+inherit flag-o-matic
+
+DESCRIPTION="Utility to apply diffs to files"
+HOMEPAGE="https://www.gnu.org/software/patch/patch.html"
+SRC_URI="mirror://gnu/patch/${P}.tar.xz"
+
+LICENSE="GPL-3+"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~amd64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
+IUSE="static test xattr"
+
+RDEPEND="xattr? ( sys-apps/attr )"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	test? ( sys-apps/ed )"
+
+PATCHES=(
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${P}-fix-test-suite.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-fix-error-handling-with-git-style-patches.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6951.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-allow-input-files-to-be-missing-for-ed-style-patches.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2018-6952.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-Do-not-crash-when-RLIMIT_NOFILE-is-set-to-RLIM_INFINITY.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix1.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2018-1000156-fix2.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13636.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-CVE-2019-13638.patch
+	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-2.7.6-Avoid-invalid-memory-access-in-context-format-diffs.patch
+)
+
+src_configure() {
+	use static && append-ldflags -static
+
+	local myeconfargs=(
+		$(use_enable xattr)
+		--program-prefix="$(use userland_BSD && echo g)"
+	)
+	# Do not let $ED mess up the search for `ed` 470210.
+	ac_cv_path_ED=$(type -P ed) \
+		econf "${myeconfargs[@]}"
+}