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net-libs/libsrtp: 1.6.0-r1 OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility

Browse Source 
Uses the patches from FreeBSD, see
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/ports?view=revision&revision=472170

Also EAPI=7

Closes: https://bugs.gentoo.org/666160
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.52, Repoman-2.3.12
Signed-off-by: Craig Andrews <candrews@gentoo.org>
This commit is contained in:
Craig Andrews
2018-12-13 09:21:13 -05:00
parent b8d19750cb
commit 18291de3d6
5 changed files with 901 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

361
net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/0b45423678ddc46d702f3a51614f20bfbd112ddd
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
@@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int
}
memset(gcm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_gcm_ctx_t));
+ gcm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (gcm->ctx == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(gcm);
+ crypto_free(*c);
+ *c = NULL;
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+
/* set pointers */
(*c)->state = gcm;
@@ -140,7 +148,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int
/* set key size */
(*c)->key_len = key_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&gcm->ctx);
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx_t*)c->state;
if (ctx) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
/* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
switch (ctx->key_size) {
case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
@@ -205,7 +212,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx
break;
}
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
@@ -227,19 +234,19 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c,
debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv));
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
/* set IV len and the IV value, the followiong 3 calls are required */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
@@ -263,9 +270,9 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_aad (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
* Set dummy tag, OpenSSL requires the Tag to be set before
* processing AAD
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad);
- rv = EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
+ rv = EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len);
if (rv != aad_len) {
return (err_status_algo_fail);
} else {
@@ -291,7 +298,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_encrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
/*
* Encrypt the data
*/
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len);
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -313,12 +320,12 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_get_tag (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
/*
* Calculate the tag
*/
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0);
/*
* Retreive the tag
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf);
/*
* Increase encryption length by desired tag size
@@ -347,14 +354,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_decrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c
/*
* Set the tag before decrypting
*/
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len,
buf + (*enc_len - c->tag_len));
- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
+ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len);
/*
* Check the tag
*/
- if (EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+ if (EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
return (err_status_auth_fail);
}
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int
}
memset(icm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_icm_ctx_t));
+ icm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (icm->ctx == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(icm);
+ crypto_free(*c);
+ *c = NULL;
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+
/* set pointers */
(*c)->state = icm;
@@ -173,7 +181,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int
/* set key size */
(*c)->key_len = key_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&icm->ctx);
return err_status_ok;
}
@@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
*/
ctx = (aes_icm_ctx_t*)c->state;
if (ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
/* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */
switch (ctx->key_size) {
case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
@@ -257,8 +264,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx);
-
switch (c->key_size) {
case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
@@ -276,7 +281,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
break;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, evp,
NULL, key, NULL)) {
return err_status_fail;
} else {
@@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL,
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL,
NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) {
return err_status_fail;
} else {
@@ -326,12 +331,12 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_encrypt (aes_icm_ctx_t *c
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "rs0: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
*enc_len = len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(c->ctx, buf, &len)) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
*enc_len += len;
--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:45:39 UTC
+++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ err_status_t
hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
{
extern auth_type_t hmac;
- uint8_t *pointer;
- HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len);
@@ -76,21 +74,43 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
return err_status_bad_param;
}
- /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
- if (pointer == NULL) {
+/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made HMAC_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated
+ using HMAC_CTX_new. But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+ {
+ /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
+ uint8_t* pointer;
+ HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
+ pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ if (pointer == NULL) {
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+ *a = (auth_t*)pointer;
+ (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t);
+ new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
+
+ HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
+ }
+
+#else
+ *a = (auth_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(auth_t));
+ if (*a == NULL) {
return err_status_alloc_fail;
}
+ (*a)->state = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if ((*a)->state == NULL) {
+ crypto_free(*a);
+ *a = NULL;
+ return err_status_alloc_fail;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* set pointers */
- *a = (auth_t*)pointer;
(*a)->type = &hmac;
- (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t);
(*a)->out_len = out_len;
(*a)->key_len = key_len;
(*a)->prefix_len = 0;
- new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
- HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
/* increment global count of all hmac uses */
hmac.ref_count++;
@@ -106,11 +126,19 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx);
/* zeroize entire state*/
octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
+
+#else
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
+
+ /* zeroize entire state*/
+ octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, sizeof(auth_t));
+#endif
/* free memory */
crypto_free(a);
--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h 2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
typedef struct {
int key_size;
int tag_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
cipher_direction_t dir;
} aes_gcm_ctx_t;
--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h 2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typedef struct {
v128_t counter; /* holds the counter value */
v128_t offset; /* initial offset value */
int key_size;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx;
} aes_icm_ctx_t;
err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir);
--- a/crypto/include/sha1.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/sha1.h
@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
-typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
-
/*
* sha1_init(&ctx) initializes the SHA1 context ctx
*
@@ -72,6 +70,12 @@ typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
*
*/
+/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made EVP_MD_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated
+ using EVP_MD_CTX_new. But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+
+typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t;
+
static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
@@ -88,7 +92,33 @@ static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32
unsigned int len = 0;
EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
}
+
+#else
+
+typedef EVP_MD_CTX* sha1_ctx_t;
+
+static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx)
+{
+ *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_DigestInit(*ctx, EVP_sha1());
+}
+
+static inline void sha1_update (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *M, int octets_in_msg)
+{
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(*ctx, M, octets_in_msg);
+}
+
+static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t *output)
+{
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+
+ EVP_DigestFinal(*ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(*ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
#else
#include "datatypes.h"

83
net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/1acba569915d8124b627a29dd5e3500332618eac
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c 2018-06-10 18:51:02 UTC
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c
@@ -187,22 +187,28 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
*/
err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key)
{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
c->dir = direction_any;
- /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */
- v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key);
+ debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
- if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE) {
- debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s",
- v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE)));
- v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1,
- key + AES_128_KEYSIZE);
+ switch (c->key_size) {
+ case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+ evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm();
+ break;
+ case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
+ evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return (err_status_bad_param);
+ break;
}
- debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) {
+ return (err_status_init_fail);
+ }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
-
return (err_status_ok);
}
@@ -214,8 +220,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx
err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, void *iv,
int direction)
{
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
-
if (direction != direction_encrypt && direction != direction_decrypt) {
return (err_status_bad_param);
}
@@ -223,19 +227,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c,
debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv));
- switch (c->key_size) {
- case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
- evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm();
- break;
- case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
- evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm();
- break;
- default:
- return (err_status_bad_param);
- break;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, (const unsigned char*)&c->key.v8,
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) {
return (err_status_init_fail);
}
--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
typedef struct {
- v256_t key;
int key_size;
int tag_len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;

113
net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/fb954450198c832c96b4191fcef3a1b9e2d15d8b
--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c 2018-06-10 20:33:16 UTC
+++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c)
*/
err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key, int len)
{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+
/*
* set counter and initial values to 'offset' value, being careful not to
* go past the end of the key buffer
@@ -252,30 +254,35 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0;
c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0;
- /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */
- v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key);
+ debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size));
+ debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
- /* if the key is greater than 16 bytes, copy the second
- * half. Note, we treat AES-192 and AES-256 the same here
- * for simplicity. The storage location receiving the
- * key is statically allocated to handle a full 32 byte key
- * regardless of the cipher in use.
- */
- if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx);
+
+ switch (c->key_size) {
+ case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
+ evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+ break;
#ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192
- || c->key_size == AES_192_KEYSIZE
+ case AES_192_KEYSIZE:
+ evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
+ break;
#endif
- ) {
- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s",
- v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE)));
- v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1, key + AES_128_KEYSIZE);
+ case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
+ evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return err_status_bad_param;
+ break;
}
- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key));
- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset));
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
+ NULL, key, NULL)) {
+ return err_status_fail;
+ } else {
+ return err_status_ok;
+ }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx);
-
return err_status_ok;
}
@@ -286,7 +293,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx
*/
err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir)
{
- const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
v128_t nonce;
/* set nonce (for alignment) */
@@ -298,25 +304,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c,
debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter));
- switch (c->key_size) {
- case AES_256_KEYSIZE:
- evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
- break;
-#ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192
- case AES_192_KEYSIZE:
- evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
- break;
-#endif
- case AES_128_KEYSIZE:
- evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
- break;
- default:
- return err_status_bad_param;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp,
- NULL, c->key.v8, c->counter.v8)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) {
return err_status_fail;
} else {
return err_status_ok;
--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h
@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@
typedef struct {
v128_t counter; /* holds the counter value */
v128_t offset; /* initial offset value */
- v256_t key;
int key_size;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
} aes_icm_ctx_t;

254
net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/5781341d99cd286a1f3d164e0576c2e837a444b7
--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
+++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c
@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@
#include <config.h>
#endif
-#include "hmac.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#include "alloc.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX 20
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
/* the debug module for authentiation */
@@ -65,26 +66,18 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
{
extern auth_type_t hmac;
uint8_t *pointer;
- hmac_ctx_t *new_hmac_ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx;
debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len);
debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len);
- /*
- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
- * than 20 bytes yet
- */
- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
- return err_status_bad_param;
- }
-
/* check output length - should be less than 20 bytes */
- if (out_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+ if (out_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return err_status_bad_param;
}
- /* allocate memory for auth and hmac_ctx_t structures */
- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */
+ pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
if (pointer == NULL) {
return err_status_alloc_fail;
}
@@ -96,8 +89,8 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len)
(*a)->out_len = out_len;
(*a)->key_len = key_len;
(*a)->prefix_len = 0;
- new_hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)((*a)->state);
- memset(new_hmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(hmac_ctx_t));
+ new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx);
/* increment global count of all hmac uses */
hmac.ref_count++;
@@ -109,19 +102,15 @@ err_status_t
hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
{
extern auth_type_t hmac;
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
- hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)a->state;
- if (hmac_ctx->ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->ctx);
- }
- if (hmac_ctx->init_ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->init_ctx);
- }
+ hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state;
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx);
+
/* zeroize entire state*/
octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a,
- sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t));
+ sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t));
/* free memory */
crypto_free(a);
@@ -133,113 +122,65 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a)
}
err_status_t
-hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
+hmac_init (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len)
{
- int i;
- uint8_t ipad[64];
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, key, key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /*
- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger
- * than 20 bytes yet
- */
- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
- return err_status_bad_param;
- }
-
- /*
- * set values of ipad and opad by exoring the key into the
- * appropriate constant values
- */
- for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) {
- ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
- state->opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
- }
- /* set the rest of ipad, opad to constant values */
- for (; i < sizeof(ipad); i++) {
- ipad[i] = 0x36;
- ((uint8_t*)state->opad)[i] = 0x5c;
- }
-
- debug_print(mod_hmac, "ipad: %s", octet_string_hex_string(ipad, sizeof(ipad)));
-
- /* initialize sha1 context */
- sha1_init(&state->init_ctx);
- state->init_ctx_initialized = 1;
-
- /* hash ipad ^ key */
- sha1_update(&state->init_ctx, ipad, sizeof(ipad));
- return (hmac_start(state));
+ return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *state)
+hmac_start (HMAC_CTX *state)
{
- if (state->ctx_initialized) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&state->ctx);
- }
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&state->ctx, &state->init_ctx)) {
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) == 0)
return err_status_auth_fail;
- } else {
- state->ctx_initialized = 1;
- return err_status_ok;
- }
+
+ return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
+hmac_update (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets)
{
debug_print(mod_hmac, "input: %s",
octet_string_hex_string(message, msg_octets));
- /* hash message into sha1 context */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
+ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
return err_status_ok;
}
err_status_t
-hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
+hmac_compute (HMAC_CTX *state, const void *message,
int msg_octets, int tag_len, uint8_t *result)
{
- uint32_t hash_value[5];
- uint32_t H[5];
+ uint8_t hash_value[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
int i;
+ unsigned int len;
/* check tag length, return error if we can't provide the value expected */
- if (tag_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) {
+ if (tag_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
return err_status_bad_param;
}
/* hash message, copy output into H */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets);
- sha1_final(&state->ctx, H);
+ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /*
- * note that we don't need to debug_print() the input, since the
- * function hmac_update() already did that for us
- */
- debug_print(mod_hmac, "intermediate state: %s",
- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H)));
+ if (HMAC_Final(state, hash_value, &len) == 0)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /* re-initialize hash context */
- sha1_init(&state->ctx);
+ if (len < tag_len)
+ return err_status_auth_fail;
- /* hash opad ^ key */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)state->opad, sizeof(state->opad));
-
- /* hash the result of the inner hash */
- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H));
-
- /* the result is returned in the array hash_value[] */
- sha1_final(&state->ctx, hash_value);
-
/* copy hash_value to *result */
for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) {
- result[i] = ((uint8_t*)hash_value)[i];
+ result[i] = hash_value[i];
}
debug_print(mod_hmac, "output: %s",
- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)hash_value, tag_len));
+ octet_string_hex_string(hash_value, tag_len));
return err_status_ok;
}
@@ -248,7 +189,7 @@ hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message,
/* begin test case 0 */
uint8_t
- hmac_test_case_0_key[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
+ hmac_test_case_0_key[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
@@ -260,7 +201,7 @@ uint8_t
};
uint8_t
- hmac_test_case_0_tag[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = {
+ hmac_test_case_0_tag[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {
0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64,
0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e,
0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00
--- a/crypto/include/hmac.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC
+++ b/crypto/include/hmac.h
@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ typedef struct {
uint8_t opad[64];
sha1_ctx_t ctx;
sha1_ctx_t init_ctx;
-#ifdef OPENSSL
- int ctx_initialized;
- int init_ctx_initialized;
-#endif
} hmac_ctx_t;
err_status_t

90
net-libs/libsrtp/libsrtp-1.6.0-r1.ebuild Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=7
inherit autotools multilib-minimal
DESCRIPTION="Open-source implementation of the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"
HOMEPAGE="https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp"
SRC_URI="https://github.com/cisco/${PN}/archive/v${PV}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz"
LICENSE="BSD"
SLOT="0/1"
KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~ppc ~ppc64 -sparc ~x86 ~x86-fbsd ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos"
IUSE="aesicm console debug doc libressl openssl static-libs syslog test"
RDEPEND="
openssl? (
!libressl? ( dev-libs/openssl:0=[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] )
)
"
DEPEND="${RDEPEND}"
DOCS=( CHANGES README TODO )
MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=(
/usr/include/srtp/config.h
)
PATCHES=(
"${FILESDIR}/${PN}-pcap-automagic-r0.patch"
"${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-hmac.patch"
"${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch"
"${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch"
"${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-1.1.patch"
)
src_prepare() {
default
# test/rtpw.c is using /usr/share/dict/words assuming it exists
# using test/rtpw.c guaratees the file exists in any case
sed -i -e "s:/usr/share/dict/words:rtpw.c:" test/rtpw.c || die
mv configure.in configure.ac || die
eautoreconf
}
multilib_src_configure() {
# stdout: default error output for messages in debug
# kernel-linux: breaks the build
# gdoi: disabled by upstream and breaks the build
# pcap: seems to be test-only
ECONF_SOURCE=${S} \
econf \
--enable-stdout \
--disable-kernel-linux \
--disable-gdoi \
--disable-pcap \
$(use_enable aesicm generic-aesicm) \
$(use_enable console) \
$(use_enable debug) \
$(use_enable openssl) \
$(use_enable syslog)
}
multilib_src_compile() {
use static-libs && emake ${PN}.a
emake shared_library
use test && emake test
}
multilib_src_test() {
# work-around tests that do not like out-of-source builds
cp "${S}"/test/{getopt_s,rtpw}.c "${BUILD_DIR}"/test/ || die
LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${BUILD_DIR}" emake -j1 runtest
# Makefile.in has '$(testapp): libsrtp.a'
if use !static-libs; then
rm libsrtp.a || die
fi
}
multilib_src_install_all() {
# libsrtp.pdf can also be generated with doxygen
# but it would be a waste of time as an up-to-date version is built
use doc && DOCS+=( doc/*.txt doc/${PN}.pdf )
einstalldocs
}