net-misc/openssh: Version bump to 8.1_p1 (no X509 patch yet)

Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.76, Repoman-2.3.17
Signed-off-by: Patrick McLean <chutzpah@gentoo.org>
This commit is contained in:
Patrick McLean
2019-10-11 16:05:19 -07:00
parent aa847b78ba
commit 0fbbcb8a73
4 changed files with 1040 additions and 0 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -16,4 +16,6 @@ DIST openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 43356 BLAKE2B 776fa140d64a16
DIST openssh-8.0p1+x509-12.1-gentoo.diff.gz 680853 BLAKE2B b24ee61d6328bf2de8384d6ecbfc5ae0be4719a3c7a2d714be3a144d327bba5038e7e36ffcc313af2a8a94960ce1f56387654d2d21920af51826af61957aa4cc SHA512 178728139473b277fe50a03f37be50b3f8e539cea8f5937ddfe710082944e799d845cdb5994f585c13564c4a89b80ccf75e87753102aebacdb4c590f0b8a1482
DIST openssh-8.0p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 7348 BLAKE2B bc3d3815f1ef5dbab605b93182a00c2fec258f49d56684defb6564d2b60886429c615a7ab076cc071a590f9df0908b1862ceb0961b7e6f6d1090237fec9035d3 SHA512 2f9f774286db75d0240e6fb01655a8a193fb2a5dc4596ad68ed22d64f97c9c46dad61a06478f2e972fd37cbad4d9aca5829bb91097cc56638601ff94a972b24f
DIST openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz 1597697 BLAKE2B 5ba79872eabb3b3964d95a8cdd690bfe0323f018d7f944d4e1acb52576c9f6d7a1ddac15e88dc42eac6ecbfabfad1c228e303a2262588769e307c38107a4cd54 SHA512 e280fa2d56f550efd37c5d2477670326261aa8b94d991f9eb17aad90e0c6c9c939efa90fe87d33260d0f709485cb05c379f0fd1bd44fc0d5190298b6398c9982
DIST openssh-8.1p1-sctp-1.2.patch.xz 7672 BLAKE2B f1aa0713fcb114d8774bd8d524d106401a9d7c2c73a05fbde200ccbdd2562b3636ddd2d0bc3eae9f04b4d7c729c3dafd814ae8c530a76c4a0190fae71d1edcd2 SHA512 2bffab0bbae5a4c1875e0cc229bfd83d8565bd831309158cd489d8b877556c69b936243888a181bd9ff302e19f2c174156781574294d260b6384c464d003d566
DIST openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz 1625894 BLAKE2B d525be921a6f49420a58df5ac434d43a0c85e0f6bf8428ecebf04117c50f473185933e6e4485e506ac614f71887a513b9962d7b47969ba785da8e3a38f767322 SHA512 b987ea4ffd4ab0c94110723860273b06ed8ffb4d21cbd99ca144a4722dc55f4bf86f6253d500386b6bee7af50f066e2aa2dd095d50746509a10e11221d39d925
DIST openssh-lpk-7.5p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17040 BLAKE2B 5b2204316dd244bb8dd11db50d5bc3a194e2cc4b64964a2d3df68bbe54c53588f15fc5176dbc3811e929573fa3e41cf91f412aa2513bb9a4b6ed02c2523c1e24 SHA512 9ce5d7e5d831c972f0f866b686bf93a048a03979ab38627973f5491eeeaa45f9faab0520b3a7ed90a13a67213fdc9cd4cf11e423acad441ea91b71037c8b435b
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index ca450f4e..2994a4e4 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -723,120 +723,6 @@ fakepw(void)
return (&fake);
}
-/*
- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
- * called.
- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
- */
-
-static char *
-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return strdup(ntop);
- }
-
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return strdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
- name, ntop);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return strdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
- lowercase(name);
-
- /*
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
- * the domain).
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
- return strdup(ntop);
- }
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (ai == NULL) {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
- return strdup(ntop);
- }
- return strdup(name);
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
- * several times.
- */
-
-const char *
-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
-{
- static char *dnsname;
-
- if (!use_dns)
- return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
- else if (dnsname != NULL)
- return dnsname;
- else {
- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
- return dnsname;
- }
-}
-
/*
* Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
* Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
{
return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+static char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+ name, ntop);
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+ lowercase(name);
+
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (ai == NULL) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return strdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+{
+ static char *dnsname;
+
+ if (!use_dns)
+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ else if (dnsname != NULL)
+ return dnsname;
+ else {
+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ return dnsname;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index f78b4d6f..747287f7 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ typedef enum {
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oGssTrustDns,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
@@ -203,9 +204,11 @@ static struct {
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
@@ -992,6 +995,10 @@ parse_time:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oGssTrustDns:
+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -1864,6 +1871,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
@@ -2011,6 +2019,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index 8e36bf32..c9e4718d 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct {
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 02a87892..95de538b 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -762,6 +762,16 @@ The default is
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Cm no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 87fa70a4..a6ffdc96 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -697,6 +697,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
OM_uint32 min;
int r, ok = 0;
gss_OID mech = NULL;
+ const char *gss_host;
+
+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
+ gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1);
+ } else
+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
* once. */
@@ -711,7 +718,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
- mech, authctxt->host)) {
+ mech, gss_host)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
authctxt->mech_tried++;
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
Only in b: .openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff.un~
Only in b: .openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff.un~
diff -ru a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff
--- a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:48:31.513603947 -0700
+++ b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:50:15.012495676 -0700
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
- cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
+ cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o cipher-ctr-mt.o \
- compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
- log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \
+ compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+ log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
diff --git a/cipher-ctr-mt.c b/cipher-ctr-mt.c
new file mode 100644
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@
+ * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
+ * then force a rekey
+ */
-+ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(active_state);
++ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
+
+ /* only do this for the ctr cipher. otherwise gcm mode breaks. Don't know why though */
+ if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@
+ * so we repoint the define to the multithreaded evp. To start the threads we
+ * then force a rekey
+ */
-+ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(active_state);
++ const void *cc = ssh_packet_get_send_context(ssh);
+
+ /* only rekey if necessary. If we don't do this gcm mode cipher breaks */
+ if (strstr(cipher_ctx_name(cc), "ctr")) {
diff -ru a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff
--- a/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 13:47:54.801642144 -0700
+++ b/openssh-7_8_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.16.diff 2019-10-10 15:58:05.085803333 -0700
@@ -162,24 +162,24 @@
}
+static int
-+channel_tcpwinsz(void)
++channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
+ socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
-+ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
++ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
+ return 128 * 1024;
+
-+ ret = getsockopt(packet_get_connection_in(),
++ ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
+ /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */
+ if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+ tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
+
+ debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d",
-+ packet_get_connection_in(), tcpwinsz);
++ ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz);
+ return tcpwinsz;
+}
+
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
c->local_consumed > 0) {
+ u_int addition = 0;
-+ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz();
++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh);
+ /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
+ if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
+ /* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */
@@ -409,18 +409,10 @@
index dcf35e6..da4ced0 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
-@@ -920,6 +920,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+@@ -920,6 +920,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
return 0;
}
-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
-+int rekey_requested = 0;
-+void
-+packet_request_rekeying(void)
-+{
-+ rekey_requested = 1;
-+}
-+
+/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr
+ * and none cipher switch */
+int
@@ -434,20 +426,6 @@
#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
static int
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
-@@ -946,6 +964,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
- if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
- return 0;
-
-+ /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none
-+ * cipher switch methods -cjr */
-+ if (rekey_requested == 1) {
-+ rekey_requested = 0;
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
- /* Time-based rekeying */
- if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
- (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
index 170203c..f4d9df2 100644
--- a/packet.h
@@ -476,9 +454,9 @@
/* Format of the configuration file:
@@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ typedef enum {
- oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
+ oDisableMTAES,
+ oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize,
+ oNoneEnabled, oNoneSwitch,
oVisualHostKey,
@@ -615,9 +593,9 @@
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
@@ -111,7 +115,10 @@ typedef struct {
-
int enable_ssh_keysign;
int64_t rekey_limit;
+ int disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/
+ int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */
+ int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */
int rekey_interval;
@@ -633,7 +611,7 @@
off_t i, statbytes;
size_t amt, nr;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
-- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
+- char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ char *last, *name, buf[16384], encname[PATH_MAX];
int len;
@@ -673,9 +651,9 @@
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
@@ -391,6 +400,43 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- }
- if (options->permit_tun == -1)
options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+ if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1)
+ options->disable_multithreaded = 0;
+ if (options->none_enabled == -1)
+ options->none_enabled = 0;
+ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
@@ -1092,7 +1070,7 @@
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-@@ -412,6 +423,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
+@@ -412,6 +423,27 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host,
if (!authctxt.success)
fatal("Authentication failed.");
@@ -1108,7 +1086,7 @@
+ memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
-+ kex_prop2buf(active_state->kex->my, myproposal);
++ kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal);
+ packet_request_rekeying();
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n");
+ } else {
@@ -1117,23 +1095,13 @@
+ fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
+ }
+ }
-+
- debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
- }
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) {
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index a738c3a..b32dbe0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
- char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
-
- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
-- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
-+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
- *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
- options.version_addendum);
-
@@ -1037,6 +1037,8 @@ listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
int ret, listen_sock;
struct addrinfo *ai;
@@ -1217,11 +1185,10 @@
index f1bbf00..21a70c2 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
+@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.8"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
-#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
-+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v16"
+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN
+
+463
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
# Copyright 1999-2019 Gentoo Authors
# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
EAPI=7
inherit user flag-o-matic multilib autotools pam systemd
# Make it more portable between straight releases
# and _p? releases.
PARCH=${P/_}
#HPN_PV="${PV^^}"
HPN_PV="7.8_P1"
HPN_VER="14.16"
HPN_PATCHES=(
${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-${HPN_VER}.diff
${PN}-${HPN_PV/./_}-hpn-AES-CTR-${HPN_VER}.diff
)
SCTP_VER="1.2" SCTP_PATCH="${PARCH}-sctp-${SCTP_VER}.patch.xz"
#X509_VER="12.1" X509_PATCH="${PARCH}+x509-${X509_VER}.diff.gz"
PATCH_SET="openssh-7.9p1-patches-1.0"
DESCRIPTION="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release"
HOMEPAGE="https://www.openssh.com/"
SRC_URI="mirror://openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/${PARCH}.tar.gz
${SCTP_PATCH:+sctp? ( https://dev.gentoo.org/~chutzpah/dist/openssh/${SCTP_PATCH} )}
${HPN_VER:+hpn? ( $(printf "mirror://sourceforge/hpnssh/HPN-SSH%%20${HPN_VER/./v}%%20${HPN_PV/_P/p}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") )}
${X509_PATCH:+X509? ( https://roumenpetrov.info/openssh/x509-${X509_VER}/${X509_PATCH} )}
"
LICENSE="BSD GPL-2"
SLOT="0"
KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
# Probably want to drop ssl defaulting to on in a future version.
IUSE="abi_mips_n32 audit bindist debug hpn kerberos kernel_linux ldns libedit libressl livecd pam +pie sctp selinux +ssl static test X X509 xmss"
RESTRICT="!test? ( test )"
REQUIRED_USE="ldns? ( ssl )
pie? ( !static )
static? ( !kerberos !pam )
X509? ( !sctp ssl )
test? ( ssl )"
LIB_DEPEND="
audit? ( sys-process/audit[static-libs(+)] )
ldns? (
net-libs/ldns[static-libs(+)]
!bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[ecdsa,ssl(+)] )
bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[-ecdsa,ssl(+)] )
)
libedit? ( dev-libs/libedit:=[static-libs(+)] )
sctp? ( net-misc/lksctp-tools[static-libs(+)] )
selinux? ( >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28[static-libs(+)] )
ssl? (
!libressl? (
|| (
(
>=dev-libs/openssl-1.0.1:0[bindist=]
<dev-libs/openssl-1.1.0:0[bindist=]
)
>=dev-libs/openssl-1.1.0g:0[bindist=]
)
dev-libs/openssl:0=[static-libs(+)]
)
libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[static-libs(+)] )
)
>=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.3:=[static-libs(+)]"
RDEPEND="
!static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} )
pam? ( virtual/pam )
kerberos? ( virtual/krb5 )"
DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND} )
virtual/pkgconfig
virtual/os-headers
sys-devel/autoconf"
RDEPEND="${RDEPEND}
pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20081028 )
userland_GNU? ( virtual/shadow )
X? ( x11-apps/xauth )"
S="${WORKDIR}/${PARCH}"
pkg_pretend() {
# this sucks, but i'd rather have people unable to `emerge -u openssh`
# than not be able to log in to their server any more
maybe_fail() { [[ -z ${!2} ]] && echo "$1" ; }
local fail="
$(use hpn && maybe_fail hpn HPN_VER)
$(use sctp && maybe_fail sctp SCTP_PATCH)
$(use X509 && maybe_fail X509 X509_PATCH)
"
fail=$(echo ${fail})
if [[ -n ${fail} ]] ; then
eerror "Sorry, but this version does not yet support features"
eerror "that you requested: ${fail}"
eerror "Please mask ${PF} for now and check back later:"
eerror " # echo '=${CATEGORY}/${PF}' >> /etc/portage/package.mask"
die "booooo"
fi
# Make sure people who are using tcp wrappers are notified of its removal. #531156
if grep -qs '^ *sshd *:' "${EROOT%/}"/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} ; then
ewarn "Sorry, but openssh no longer supports tcp-wrappers, and it seems like"
ewarn "you're trying to use it. Update your ${EROOT}etc/hosts.{allow,deny} please."
fi
}
src_prepare() {
sed -i \
-e "/_PATH_XAUTH/s:/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth:${EPREFIX%/}/usr/bin/xauth:" \
pathnames.h || die
# don't break .ssh/authorized_keys2 for fun
sed -i '/^AuthorizedKeysFile/s:^:#:' sshd_config || die
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch #165444 integrated into gsskex
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch
[[ -d ${WORKDIR}/patches ]] && eapply "${WORKDIR}"/patches
local PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS=()
if use X509 ; then
pushd "${WORKDIR}" &>/dev/null || die
eapply "${FILESDIR}/${P}-X509-glue-"${X509_VER}".patch"
eapply "${FILESDIR}/${P}-X509-dont-make-piddir-"${X509_VER}".patch"
popd &>/dev/null || die
eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${X509_PATCH%.*}
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-X509-$(ver_cut 1-2 ${X509_VER})-tests.patch
# We need to patch package version or any X.509 sshd will reject our ssh client
# with "userauth_pubkey: could not parse key: string is too large [preauth]"
# error
einfo "Patching package version for X.509 patch set ..."
sed -i \
-e "s/^AC_INIT(\[OpenSSH\], \[Portable\]/AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [${X509_VER}]/" \
"${S}"/configure.ac || die "Failed to patch package version for X.509 patch"
einfo "Patching version.h to expose X.509 patch set ..."
sed -i \
-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE.*/a #define SSH_X509 \"-PKIXSSH-${X509_VER}\"" \
"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in X.509 patch version"
PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_X509' )
fi
if use sctp ; then
eapply "${WORKDIR}"/${SCTP_PATCH%.*}
einfo "Patching version.h to expose SCTP patch set ..."
sed -i \
-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_SCTP \"-sctp-${SCTP_VER}\"" \
"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in SCTP patch version"
PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_SCTP' )
einfo "Disabling know failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch ..."
sed -i \
-e "/\t\tcfgparse \\\/d" \
"${S}"/regress/Makefile || die "Failed to disable known failing test (cfgparse) caused by SCTP patch"
fi
if use hpn ; then
local hpn_patchdir="${T}/${P}-hpn${HPN_VER}"
mkdir "${hpn_patchdir}"
cp $(printf -- "${DISTDIR}/%s\n" "${HPN_PATCHES[@]}") "${hpn_patchdir}"
pushd "${hpn_patchdir}" &>/dev/null || die
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.1_p1-hpn-glue.patch
if use X509; then
einfo "Will disable MT AES cipher due to incompatbility caused by X509 patch set"
# X509 and AES-CTR-MT don't get along, let's just drop it
rm openssh-${HPN_PV//./_}-hpn-AES-CTR-${HPN_VER}.diff || die
eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-8.0_p1-hpn-X509-glue.patch
fi
use sctp && eapply "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.9_p1-hpn-sctp-glue.patch
popd &>/dev/null || die
eapply "${hpn_patchdir}"
if ! use X509; then
eapply "${FILESDIR}/openssh-7.9_p1-hpn-openssl-1.1.patch"
eapply "${FILESDIR}/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch"
fi
einfo "Patching Makefile.in for HPN patch set ..."
sed -i \
-e "/^LIBS=/ s/\$/ -lpthread/" \
"${S}"/Makefile.in || die "Failed to patch Makefile.in"
einfo "Patching version.h to expose HPN patch set ..."
sed -i \
-e "/^#define SSH_PORTABLE/a #define SSH_HPN \"-hpn${HPN_VER//./v}\"" \
"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to sed-in HPN patch version"
PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS+=( 'SSH_HPN' )
if [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then
einfo "Disabling known non-working MT AES cipher per default ..."
cat > "${T}"/disable_mtaes.conf <<- EOF
# HPN's Multi-Threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken
# and therefore disabled per default.
DisableMTAES yes
EOF
sed -i \
-e "/^#HPNDisabled.*/r ${T}/disable_mtaes.conf" \
"${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to disabled MT AES ciphers in sshd_config"
sed -i \
-e "/AcceptEnv.*_XXX_TEST$/a \\\tDisableMTAES\t\tyes" \
"${S}"/regress/test-exec.sh || die "Failed to disable MT AES ciphers in test config"
fi
fi
if use X509 || use sctp || use hpn ; then
einfo "Patching sshconnect.c to use SSH_RELEASE in send_client_banner() ..."
sed -i \
-e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \
"${S}"/sshconnect.c || die "Failed to patch send_client_banner() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshconnect.c)"
einfo "Patching sshd.c to use SSH_RELEASE in sshd_exchange_identification() ..."
sed -i \
-e "s/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION/PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE/" \
"${S}"/sshd.c || die "Failed to patch sshd_exchange_identification() to use SSH_RELEASE (sshd.c)"
einfo "Patching version.h to add our patch sets to SSH_RELEASE ..."
sed -i \
-e "s/^#define SSH_RELEASE.*/#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE ${PATCHSET_VERSION_MACROS[*]}/" \
"${S}"/version.h || die "Failed to patch SSH_RELEASE (version.h)"
fi
sed -i \
-e "/#UseLogin no/d" \
"${S}"/sshd_config || die "Failed to remove removed UseLogin option (sshd_config)"
eapply_user #473004
tc-export PKG_CONFIG
local sed_args=(
-e "s:-lcrypto:$(${PKG_CONFIG} --libs openssl):"
# Disable PATH reset, trust what portage gives us #254615
-e 's:^PATH=/:#PATH=/:'
# Disable fortify flags ... our gcc does this for us
-e 's:-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2::'
)
# The -ftrapv flag ICEs on hppa #505182
use hppa && sed_args+=(
-e '/CFLAGS/s:-ftrapv:-fdisable-this-test:'
-e '/OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK.*-ftrapv/d'
)
# _XOPEN_SOURCE causes header conflicts on Solaris
[[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] && sed_args+=(
-e 's/-D_XOPEN_SOURCE//'
)
sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" configure{.ac,} || die
eautoreconf
}
src_configure() {
addwrite /dev/ptmx
use debug && append-cppflags -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
use static && append-ldflags -static
use xmss && append-cflags -DWITH_XMSS
local myconf=(
--with-ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
--disable-strip
--with-pid-dir="${EPREFIX}"$(usex kernel_linux '' '/var')/run
--sysconfdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/etc/ssh
--libexecdir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/misc
--datadir="${EPREFIX%/}"/usr/share/openssh
--with-privsep-path="${EPREFIX%/}"/var/empty
--with-privsep-user=sshd
$(use_with audit audit linux)
$(use_with kerberos kerberos5 "${EPREFIX%/}"/usr)
# We apply the sctp patch conditionally, so can't pass --without-sctp
# unconditionally else we get unknown flag warnings.
$(use sctp && use_with sctp)
$(use_with ldns ldns "${EPREFIX%/}"/usr)
$(use_with libedit)
$(use_with pam)
$(use_with pie)
$(use_with selinux)
$(use_with ssl openssl)
$(use_with ssl md5-passwords)
$(use_with ssl ssl-engine)
$(use_with !elibc_Cygwin hardening) #659210
)
# stackprotect is broken on musl x86 and ppc
use elibc_musl && ( use x86 || use ppc ) && myconf+=( --without-stackprotect )
# The seccomp sandbox is broken on x32, so use the older method for now. #553748
use amd64 && [[ ${ABI} == "x32" ]] && myconf+=( --with-sandbox=rlimit )
econf "${myconf[@]}"
}
src_test() {
local t skipped=() failed=() passed=()
local tests=( interop-tests compat-tests )
local shell=$(egetshell "${UID}")
if [[ ${shell} == */nologin ]] || [[ ${shell} == */false ]] ; then
elog "Running the full OpenSSH testsuite requires a usable shell for the 'portage'"
elog "user, so we will run a subset only."
skipped+=( tests )
else
tests+=( tests )
fi
# It will also attempt to write to the homedir .ssh.
local sshhome=${T}/homedir
mkdir -p "${sshhome}"/.ssh
for t in "${tests[@]}" ; do
# Some tests read from stdin ...
HOMEDIR="${sshhome}" HOME="${sshhome}" SUDO="" \
emake -k -j1 ${t} </dev/null \
&& passed+=( "${t}" ) \
|| failed+=( "${t}" )
done
einfo "Passed tests: ${passed[*]}"
[[ ${#skipped[@]} -gt 0 ]] && ewarn "Skipped tests: ${skipped[*]}"
[[ ${#failed[@]} -gt 0 ]] && die "Some tests failed: ${failed[*]}"
}
# Gentoo tweaks to default config files.
tweak_ssh_configs() {
local locale_vars=(
# These are language variables that POSIX defines.
# http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_02
LANG LC_ALL LC_COLLATE LC_CTYPE LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME
# These are the GNU extensions.
# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/html_node/Special-Shell-Variables.html
LANGUAGE LC_ADDRESS LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_NAME LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE
)
# First the server config.
cat <<-EOF >> "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config
# Allow client to pass locale environment variables. #367017
AcceptEnv ${locale_vars[*]}
# Allow client to pass COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540
AcceptEnv COLORTERM
EOF
# Then the client config.
cat <<-EOF >> "${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/ssh_config
# Send locale environment variables. #367017
SendEnv ${locale_vars[*]}
# Send COLORTERM to match TERM. #658540
SendEnv COLORTERM
EOF
if use pam ; then
sed -i \
-e "/^#UsePAM /s:.*:UsePAM yes:" \
-e "/^#PasswordAuthentication /s:.*:PasswordAuthentication no:" \
-e "/^#PrintMotd /s:.*:PrintMotd no:" \
-e "/^#PrintLastLog /s:.*:PrintLastLog no:" \
"${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
fi
if use livecd ; then
sed -i \
-e '/^#PermitRootLogin/c# Allow root login with password on livecds.\nPermitRootLogin Yes' \
"${ED%/}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
fi
}
src_install() {
emake install-nokeys DESTDIR="${D}"
fperms 600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
dobin contrib/ssh-copy-id
newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.initd sshd
newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd-r1.confd sshd
newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.pam_include.2 sshd
tweak_ssh_configs
doman contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
dodoc CREDITS OVERVIEW README* TODO sshd_config
use hpn && dodoc HPN-README
use X509 || dodoc ChangeLog
diropts -m 0700
dodir /etc/skel/.ssh
keepdir /var/empty
systemd_dounit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.{service,socket}
systemd_newunit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd_at.service 'sshd@.service'
}
pkg_preinst() {
enewgroup sshd 22
enewuser sshd 22 -1 /var/empty sshd
}
pkg_postinst() {
if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-5.8_p1" ; then
elog "Starting with openssh-5.8p1, the server will default to a newer key"
elog "algorithm (ECDSA). You are encouraged to manually update your stored"
elog "keys list as servers update theirs. See ssh-keyscan(1) for more info."
fi
if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.0_p1" ; then
elog "Starting with openssh-6.7, support for USE=tcpd has been dropped by upstream."
elog "Make sure to update any configs that you might have. Note that xinetd might"
elog "be an alternative for you as it supports USE=tcpd."
fi
if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.1_p1" ; then #557388 #555518
elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, support for ssh-dss keys were disabled due to their"
elog "weak sizes. If you rely on these key types, you can re-enable the key types by"
elog "adding to your sshd_config or ~/.ssh/config files:"
elog " PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=+ssh-dss"
elog "You should however generate new keys using rsa or ed25519."
elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, the default for PermitRootLogin changed from 'yes'"
elog "to 'prohibit-password'. That means password auth for root users no longer works"
elog "out of the box. If you need this, please update your sshd_config explicitly."
fi
if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.6_p1" ; then
elog "Starting with openssh-7.6p1, openssh upstream has removed ssh1 support entirely."
elog "Furthermore, rsa keys with less than 1024 bits will be refused."
fi
if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.7_p1" ; then
elog "Starting with openssh-7.7p1, we no longer patch openssh to provide LDAP functionality."
elog "Install sys-auth/ssh-ldap-pubkey and use OpenSSH's \"AuthorizedKeysCommand\" option"
elog "if you need to authenticate against LDAP."
elog "See https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/SSH/LDAP_migration for more details."
fi
if ! use ssl && has_version "${CATEGORY}/${PN}[ssl]" ; then
elog "Be aware that by disabling openssl support in openssh, the server and clients"
elog "no longer support dss/rsa/ecdsa keys. You will need to generate ed25519 keys"
elog "and update all clients/servers that utilize them."
fi
if use hpn && [[ -n "${HPN_DISABLE_MTAES}" ]] ; then
elog ""
elog "HPN's multi-threaded AES CTR cipher is currently known to be broken"
elog "and therefore disabled at runtime per default."
elog "Make sure your sshd_config is up to date and contains"
elog ""
elog " DisableMTAES yes"
elog ""
elog "Otherwise you maybe unable to connect to this sshd using any AES CTR cipher."
elog ""
fi
}